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14-4402. Falsification of documents.

2	For you to find the defendant guilty of falsification of documents as charged in Count,
3	the [State] state must prove to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following
4	elements of the crime:
5	1. The defendant knowingly
6	[made or caused to be made a misrepresentation of a material fact required to be furnished
7	under the program. A material fact is a fact that is integral to the right to Medicaid payments and
8	that has a natural tendency to influence the Human Services Department to pay for [unnecessary
9	services] [services not provided in the stated quality or amount] [or] [services to a person not
10	authorized to receive them.]
11	<u>[or]</u>
12	[failed or caused the failure to include a material fact required to be furnished under the
13	program in any record required to be retained in connection with the program. A material fact is a
14	fact that is integral to the right to Medicaid payments and that has a natural tendency to influence
15	the Human Services Department to pay for [unnecessary services] [services not provided in the
16	stated quality or amount] [or] [services to a person not authorized to receive them.]
17	<u>[or]</u>
18	[submitted or caused to be submitted false or incomplete information for the purpose of
19	receiving benefits or qualifying as a provider] ¹ .
20	2. This happened in New Mexico on or about the day of
21	,
22	
23	USE NOTES

- 1. Use only the applicable bracketed elements established by the evidence.
- 2 2. The applicable definition or definitions from UJI 14-4401 NMRA must be given
- 3 after this instruction.
- 4 [Adopted by Supreme Court Order No. 14-8300-005, effective for all cases filed or pending on
- or after December 31, 2014; as amended by Supreme Court Order No. 22-8300-034, effective for
- 6 <u>all cases pending or filed on or after December 31, 2022.</u>]
- 7 **Committee commentary.** See NMSA 1978, § 30-44-4 (1989).
- 8 The Medicaid Fraud Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 30-44-1 to 30-44-8 (1989, as amended through
- 9 2004), delegates to the Human Services Department the authority to establish broad and detailed
- 10 record and reporting requirements by regulation—enforceable by civil and criminal penalties. See,
- 11 e.g., § 30-44-5(A)(4); § 30-44-8(F). Section 30-44-4(A) has two distinct provisions for
- 12 falsification of documents: Section 30-44-4(A)(1) explicitly requires that the fact in question be
- "material." Section 30-44-4(A)(2) does not require that the false or incomplete information be
- 14 "material." The Committee believes that this distinction was intentional because under Section 30-
- 15 44-4(A)(2), in addition to the requirement that a defendant act knowingly, the Legislature also
- required a showing that the false or incomplete information was submitted for "the purpose of
- 17 receiving benefits or qualifying as a provider."
- Both subsections require knowing conduct, i.e., conscious behavior between general
- criminal intent and specific intent. See State v. Ramos, 2013-NMSC-031, ¶ 28, 305 P.3d 921
- 20 (discussing scienter required for violating an order of protection); see also State v. Hernandez, A-
- 21 1-CA-32109, mem. op. ¶ 25 (N.M. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2014) (nonprecedential) (construing *Ramos*,
- 22 <u>2013-NMSC-031</u>, in the context of Medicaid false document charge).
- 23 The Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution require trial courts to

- submit the issue of materiality to the jury. *United States v. Gaudin*, 515 U.S. 506, 508, 511, 522-
- 2 23 (1995) (reviewing conviction of making false statements on loan documents); State v.
- 3 Benavidez, 1999-NMCA-053, ¶¶ 14-16, 127 N.M. 189, 979 P.2d 234 (following Gaudin and
- 4 <u>holding materiality of a false statement is a mixed question of law and fact for the jury)</u>, rev'd on
- 5 *other grounds*, 1999-NMSC-041, ¶¶ 2, 5, 128 N.M. 261, 992 P.2d 274.
- 6 The touchstone of materiality is whether the statement or omission "has a natural tendency
- 7 to influence" the decision of the relevant agency or tribunal. See, e.g., State v. Silva, 2007-NMCA-
- 8 117, ¶ 16, 168 P.3d 1110 (quoting *Benavidez*, 1999-NMCA-053, ¶ 26), rev'd on other grounds,
- 9 2008-NMSC-051, 192 P.3d 1192; State v. Watkins, 1979-NMCA-003, ¶ 38, 92 N.M. 470, 590
- 10 P.2d 169 (citing *United States v. Abrams*, 568 F.2d 411 (5th Cir. 1978)).
- 11 The Medicaid Fraud Act does not provide a definition of "material." Sections 30-44-1 to -
- 12 8; cf. NMSA 1978, § 30-16-29 (1971) (providing no definition of material in the offense of
- fraudulent taking, receiving, or transferring credit cards). Further, "not every regulatory deficiency
- 14 constitutes actionable false or fraudulent conduct under the [Medicaid Fraud Act]." State ex rel.
- 15 King v. Behavioral Home Care, Inc., 2015-NMCA-035, ¶ 27, 346 P.3d 377.
- To assist the jury in determining whether a misrepresentation or omission of fact was
- material, the Committee believes that, in addition to the "natural tendency" general definition of
- materiality, materiality in the context of the Medicaid Fraud Act requires a nexus to facts about
- "the nature, quality, amount, and medical necessity of services furnished to an eligible recipient"
- that affects payment of Medicaid funds. See 8.302.1.17 NMAC; Behavioral Home Care, Inc.,
- 21 2015- NMCA-035, ¶ 21 ("Section 30-44-7(A)(3) imposes a materiality element which requires
- 22 that the false or fraudulent certification be integral to the government's payment decision."
- 23 (emphasis added)).

- 1 Unlike the offense under the Medicaid Fraud Act of failure to retain records, § 30-44-5, or
- 2 Medicaid fraud, § 30-44-7, falsification of documents (§ 30-44-4) does not predicate punishment
- 3 <u>on a dollar amount.</u>
- 4 [Adopted by Supreme Court Order No. 14-8300-005, effective for all cases filed or pending on or
- 5 after December 31, 2014; as amended by Supreme Court Order No. 22-8300-034, effective for all
- 6 cases pending or filed on or after December 31, 2022.]