

1     **14-5191. Self defense; limitations; aggressor.<sup>1</sup>**

2             [Self defense is not available to the defendant if he [started the fight] [or] [agreed to  
3 fight]<sup>†</sup> unless:

4     ~~\_\_\_\_\_ [1. The defendant was using force which would not ordinarily create a substantial  
5 risk of death or great bodily harm; and~~

6     ~~\_\_\_\_\_ 2. \_\_\_\_\_ (*name of victim*) responded with force which would  
7 ordinarily create a substantial risk of death or great bodily harm];~~

8     ~~{OR}~~

9     ~~\_\_\_\_\_ [1. The defendant tried to stop the fight;~~

10     ~~\_\_\_\_\_ 2. The defendant let \_\_\_\_\_ (*name of victim*) know he no longer  
11 wanted to fight; and~~

12     ~~\_\_\_\_\_ 3. \_\_\_\_\_ (*name of victim*) became the aggressor.}]~~

13             Before you consider whether the defendant acted in self defense, you must first  
14     decide whether the defendant was the first aggressor. The defendant was the first aggressor  
15     if the defendant

16             [started the fight with \_\_\_\_\_ (*name of victim*)]<sup>2</sup>

17             [or]

18             [agreed to fight with \_\_\_\_\_ (*name of victim*)]

19             [or]

20             [intentionally provoked a fight in order to harm \_\_\_\_\_ (*name of*  
21     *victim*)]



1           4.     This alternative should be used when the defendant provoked the victim  
2     through an unlawful act and the victim responded in a lawful manner. See *State v. Denzel*  
3     *B.*, 2008-NMCA-118, 144 N.M. 746, 192 P.3d 260; see also committee commentary, *infra*.

4           5.     Use this bracketed alternative in cases where UJI 14-5191A NMRA will not  
5     be given.

6           6.     Use this bracketed alternative in cases where UJI 14-5191A will be given. If  
7     UJI 14-5191A will be given, it should immediately follow this instruction.

8     [As amended by Supreme Court Order No. 19-8300-016, effective for all cases pending or  
9     filed on or after December 31, 2019.]

10           **Committee commentary.** — [¶] A defendant’s “claim of self defense may fail if  
11     the defendant was the aggressor or instigator of the conflict.” *State v. Lucero*, 1998-NMSC-  
12     044, ¶ 7, 126 N.M. 552, 972 P.2d 1143 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In  
13     *State v. Chavez*, 1983-NMSC-037, 99 N.M. 609, 661 P.2d 887, the defendant was a first  
14     aggressor when he entered a convenience store with a knife intending to rob the store and  
15     subsequently stabbed and killed a patron who tried to stop the robbery. *Id.* ¶ 6. The Supreme  
16     Court held that it is “well established in this jurisdiction that a defendant who provokes an  
17     encounter, as a result of which he finds it necessary to use deadly force to defend himself,  
18     is guilty of an unlawful homicide and cannot avail himself of the claim that he was acting  
19     in self-defense.” *Id.* *Lucero* then clarified that if the defendant was an aggressor or instigator  
20     of the conflict, self-defense is still available if the “defendant was using force which would  
21     not ordinarily create a substantial risk of death or great bodily harm; and [the] . . . victim

1 responded with force which would ordinarily create a substantial risk of death or great bodily  
2 harm[.]” 1998-NMSC-044, ¶ 7 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, the  
3 right of self-defense can be reinstated if the victim responds by escalating the conflict or  
4 pursues the conflict after the defendant attempts to disengage. See 2 Wayne R. LaFave,  
5 Substantive Criminal Law § 10.4(e) (3d ed. Oct. 2017 update); see also Territory v. Clarke,  
6 1909-NMSC-005, ¶ 8, 15 N.M. 35, 99 P. 697 (upholding conviction where jury was  
7 instructed that defendant could claim self defense if “defendant in reality and in good faith  
8 endeavored to decline any further struggle before the fatal shot was fired”).

9 The state bears the burden of proving that the defendant was the first aggressor  
10 beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Pruett, 1918-NMSC-062, ¶ 9, 24 N.M. 68, 172 P.  
11 1044[-(1918), the court stated that an instruction on this subject, or at least some part of it,  
12 is habitually given in New Mexico with instructions on self-defense. The committee believed  
13 that the use of this instruction, as with all instructions, is limited to cases where the matter  
14 has been put in issue by the evidence. See Annot., 55 A.L.R.3d 1000 (1974); LaFave &  
15 Scott, Criminal Law 395 (1972)].

16 [This instruction is not to be given if the defendant knew that there was no further  
17 danger from his opponent. See LaFave & Scott, Criminal Law 395 (1972). See also State v.  
18 Garcia, 1971-NMCA-121, 83 N.M. 51, 487 P.2d 1356[(1971)], where it was held erroneous  
19 to instruct the jury that the defendant could not pursue the aggressor after the aggressor was  
20 no longer able to continue the conflict or present a danger to the defendant.]

21 The bracketed “lawful” term in this instruction should be used and defined if there

1 is an issue about whether the victim’s use of force may have been a lawful response to the  
2 defendant’s conduct. See Use Note 3. For example, *State v. Southworth* held that the  
3 self-defense instruction was improper because it did not require the jury to determine  
4 whether the victim acted reasonably in defense of her home when she used potentially  
5 deadly force against the trespassing defendant. See 2002-NMCA-091, ¶¶ 18-19, 132 N.M.  
6 615, 52 P.3d 987 (“The trial court should instruct the jury that [the defendant] had the right  
7 to stand his ground and did not need to retreat unless he was threatened with lawful force.  
8 In order to determine whether the force used by [the victim] was lawful, the jury must  
9 conclude that [she] acted reasonably in defending her home against the perceived threat of  
10 the commission of a felony (similar to the elements of defense of habitation set for in UJI  
11 14-5170).”).

12 Similarly, *State v. Denzel B.* held that the self-defense instruction was improper  
13 because it failed to instruct the jury that the victim’s conduct, grabbing the defendant by the  
14 shirt after the defendant pushed him, may have been protected by the parental privilege. See  
15 2008-NMCA-118, ¶¶ 3-4, 17, 144 N.M. 746, 192 P.3d 260 (“We therefore hold that when  
16 a child asserts self-defense as justification for battery against his parent, the jury must first  
17 determine whether the parent’s use of physical discipline was reasonable under the  
18 circumstances.”). In both *Southworth* and *Denzel B.*, the court held that the jury must be  
19 instructed that the state must prove that the defendant did not act in self-defense, taking into  
20 account whether the victim’s response to the defendant’s conduct was lawful under the  
21 particular circumstances of the case. Accord *State v. Lara*, 1989-NMCA-098, ¶¶ 7-9, 109

- 1 N.M. 294, 784 P.2d 1037 (explaining defendant had no right to defend against store  
2 employees who had a lawful right to seize defendant for shoplifting).  
3 [As amended by Supreme Court Order No. 19-8300-016, effective for all cases pending or  
4 filed on or after December 31, 2019.]