1	13-811. Acceptance; when shence is acceptance.
2	[Silence is acceptance only under [one or more of] the following condition[s]:
3	[Iftook the benefits of an offer, knowing of's
4	intent to receive something in return;]
5	[or]
6	[If an offer gave reason to understand that
7	would consider silence as an acceptance;]
8	[or]
9	[If the previous dealings of the parties reasonably indicate that an offer can be accepted by
10	silence or inaction].]
11	The silence or inaction of (name of offeree) constitutes acceptance only if:
12	[
13	opportunity to reject the benefit[s], knowing that (name of offeror) expected
14	compensation in return];
15	<u>[or]</u>
16	[(name of offeror) stated or gave (name of offeree) reason to
17	understand that the offer could be accepted through silence or inaction and (name of
18	offeree) intended to accept the offer through silence or inaction];
19	<u>[or]</u>
20	[Where because of past dealings between the parties, it is reasonable that (name
21	of offeree) should have notified (name of offeror) that [he] [she] [it] did not intend
22	to accept the offer]. RCR No. 483

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2	USE NOTES
3	[Where silence is claimed to constitute an acceptance, this instruction should be given with
4	UJI 13-807 and 13-816 NMRA. Use only the condition(s) listed above which may be applicable
5	to the facts.]
6	When a case presents a jury question as to whether a party's silence or inaction constituted
7	acceptance of an offer, this instruction should be given. The bracketed language should be inserted
8	to the extent warranted by the evidence in a case.
9	[Adopted, effective November 1, 1991; as amended by Supreme Court Order No. 20-8300-006,
10	effective for all cases pending or filed on or after December 31, 2020.]
11	Committee commentary. — [Silence or inaction may become an acceptance only when
12	the circumstances would impose upon the offeree a duty to speak. Garcia v. Middle Rio Grande
13	Conservancy District, 99 N.M. 802, 664 P.2d 1000 (Ct. App. 1983); Vance v. Forty Eight Star
14	Mill, 54 N.M. 144, 215 P.2d 1016 (1949); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 69.
15	The first condition described in this instruction is illustrated by Acme Cigarette Services,
16	Inc. v. Gallegos, 91 N.M. 577, 577 P.2d 885 (Ct. App. 1978), in which a party accepted the benefits
17	of an option contract and, after one year, attempted to break the contract and avoid his obligations,
18	claiming that his silence had not constituted an acceptance. The construction of silence in the
19	course of dealing between parties (the third condition above) is illustrated by McCoy v. Alsup, 94
20	N.M. 255, 609 P.2d 337 (Ct. App. 1980) (offerors' silence in response to offeree's letter confirming
21	conditional acceptance constituted an admission and assent to the conditional acceptance).

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Supreme Court Approved November 1, 2020

1	The conditions described in this instruction reflect those clearly recognized by the existing
2	reported decisions. The question is one of reasonableness in the circumstances and the listed
3	conditions are not intended to be exclusive. They may be supplemented in a particular case where
4	appropriate.]
5	Ordinarily, silence or inaction does not constitute acceptance of an offer. However, in the
6	circumstances addressed by the instruction, silence or inaction may be found to constitute
7	acceptance. The circumstances are ones which give rise to a duty on the part of the offeree to speak
8	if the offeree does not intend to accept the offer. See Garcia v. Middle Rio Grande Conservancy
9	Dist., 1983-NMCA-047, ¶ 22, 99 N.M. 802, 664 P.2d 1000 ("Silence is acceptance only when
10	there is a duty to speak."); see generally Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 69 (1981)
11	(discussing the circumstances and identifying potential limitations on their applicability).
12	[As amended by Supreme Court Order No. 20-8300-006, effective for all cases pending or filed
13	on or after December 31, 2020.]